Explainer: What the AAP-Congress rift means for Opposition unity?

The protests at Jantar Mantar were intended to unite the Opposition in its fight against the government. Instead, they became a flashpoint for an old feud. The demonstrations led by the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) drew large crowds, prompting both the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party to seek a place in the movement, even as each accused the other of trying to hijack it.

When the leader of the opposition Rahul Gandhi staged a dharna outside Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s residence, AAP leader Atishi took a swipe at him on X, posting: “Wah! Kya jugalbandi hain!” Congress leaders, meanwhile, have alleged that the CJP is acting on the instructions of AAP convenor Arvind Kejriwal.

The rift became more pronounced in October, when the Congress and its INDIA bloc allies marched towards the Supreme Court, while the Aam Aadmi Party joined the CJP’s separate protest.

AAP was notably absent from Congress-led protests and meetings held between October 6 and 9. These included Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi Vadra’s sit-in at Akashvani Bhawan, Opposition meetings convened by Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge, and a march to Rashtrapati Bhawan.

The fault lines in AAP-Congress relations

The rift between the Aam Adami party and Congress did not start with Rahul Gandhi's latest protest. It signifies a protracted struggle over who gets to represent the opposition to the BJP, in which, at the national level, both have cooperated while continuing to eat into each other’s electoral constituency at the state level. At the center of the rivalry is the fact that both parties largely pursue the same predominantly secular electorate. It has often cut the anti-BJP vote, helping it to gain an advantage in elections in several contests.

AAP essentially emerged from the 2011 India against Corruption movement that attacked the Congress-led UPA government and Delhi’s Sheila Dikshit Government. The Congress was not only dethroned by the AAP in Delhi in 2014, but also eroded its base nationally. It again defeated the party in Punjab, eating into its core electorate.

The 2024 alliance in Delhi was a pragmatic arrangement rather than a resolution of the rivalry to counter a common adversary. The AAP contested four seats and the Congress three. However, the BJP won all seven. It showed how they could divide constituencies to oppose the BJP; it also demonstrated that seat sharing alone could not guarantee success in the elections. A section in the Congress has remained anti AAP, because of its anti-corruption movement that dented the party nationally, and contributed to the BJP’s wider acceptance. It was claimed by the Congress that the campaign had covert RSS- BJP backing.

Congress leaders also blame AAP for their decline in Gujarat, Goa and Haryana. In 2023, the AAP said it would join the INDIA Bloc meeting in Patna, conditional on the Congress opposing the Centre’s Delhi Services ordinance; Kejriwal left midway. The alliance worked in Delhi and a few other states, but failed in Punjab or Haryana. AAP officially left the Bloc in 2025.

In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, in Punjab, the Congress won thirteen , AAP three. In recent municipal polls, AAP won nearly half of 1977 wards; the Congress won fewer than 400. With elections due in 2027, the Congress leaders argue an alliance would only revive the Akali Dal or the BJP.

Joining Rahul Gandhi in the protests could cement a collective challenge to the BJP, but it could mean greater visibility for the Congress, and help strengthen its claim to lead the opposition. It essentially allows AAP to maintain a separate political profile. The immediate political beneficiary of the ensuing disunity may be the BJP. It increasingly mirrors that in the electoral battle.

What does it mean for Opposition Unity?

The rift between the Aam Aadmi Party and Congress exposes a serious fault line facing the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance; the difficulty of sustaining unity at the national level when its constituent parties challenge each other in individual states. Their conflict creates a dilemma for the bloc: a stronger Congress could come at the AAP’s expense in Punjab, while a stronger AAP could mean further weakening of the congress’s state-level position.

Neither can subordinate its state-level ambitions to the national ambitions of the alliance, specifically as the 2027 Punjab Assembly election nears. Such rifts impact the ability of the opposition to establish a consistent political narrative. When a party decides to stay away, it shifts the attention away from the issue being protested to the internal disagreements in the Opposition.

However, the absence of one party does not spell a collapse of the opposition nor does it mean an unwillingness to cooperate on other issues. They can disagree over tactics while consistently cooperating in elections. The more pressing question is whether there are mechanisms in the alliance to manage these disagreements without allowing the individual state rivalry to undermine its national objectives. Unless the INDIA bloc can distinguish between state-level electoral competition and national-level coordination, its unity risks remaining tactical rather than strategic.